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A World Without Prosecutors
Jeffrey Bellin*
Bennett Capers’ article Against Prosecutors challenges us to imagine a
world where we “turn away from prosecution as we know it,” and shift “power
from prosecutors to the people they purport to represent.”1 In this world, crime
victims decide whether to prosecute their own cases, and public prosecutors play
a subsidiary role, taking primary responsibility only for cases “where the state is
truly a victim (such as tax fraud).”2 This leaves a large category of cases –
victimless crimes – without any prosecutor at all; Capers singles out drug
offenses as “the biggest examples.”3 Without prosecutors championing these and
analogous cases, there would be far fewer prosecutions, “quite possibly, reducing
mass incarceration.”4
Capers joins a long line of authors seeking to attack mass incarceration by
reducing the role of prosecutors. I agree with these authors that we should
dramatically shrink the footprint of American criminal law and ending the war
on drugs is a good place to start. But while Capers styles his proposal as a
“[r]adical change,”5 I find the focus on prosecutors in this context decidedly
indirect. This follows from my distinct diagnosis of the drivers of criminal justice
policy. While Capers acknowledges that “judges, legislators, [and] police play
[a] role in the criminal justice system,” he echoes a dominant theme in legal
scholarship that “their power pales in comparison to that of prosecutors.”6 This
argument has roots in the writings of the influential scholar Bill Stuntz7 and was
energized, more recently, by John Pfaff’s provocative claim that a change in
prosecutorial filing practices was the “one thing” that largely caused Mass
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1. Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1561, 1563, 1609 (2020).
2. Id. at 1593.
3. Id. at 1592.
4. Id. at 1564.
5. Id. at 1609.
6. Id. at 1570-71.
7. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 173 (2019) (tracing
ubiquitous prosecutorial preeminence claims).
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Incarceration.8 Capers draws on both these scholars9 and follows their
contentions to a logical conclusion. If we want a different system, Capers argues,
we must rebuild it without prosecutors or, more precisely, we must “turn away
from public prosecutors.”10
The problem with all of this is that both the Stuntzian view of prosecutors
as America’s dominant criminal justice actor and Pfaff’s empirical claims about
their primary agency in generating mass incarceration are flawed. 11 Prosecutors

8. John F. Pfaff, LOCKED IN 73 (2017) (“It’s important to be wary of ‘one thing explains it all’
theories, especially for a phenomenon as complex as prison growth. These results, however, certainly
support a claim of ‘one thing explains most of it.’”); id. at 72 (“‘The only thing that really grew over
time was the rate at which prosecutors filed felony charges against arrestees’’).
9. Against Prosecutors, supra note 1, at 1568 (“There is a reason John Pfaff, in his analysis of
mass incarceration, concluded that much of the blame lies with prosecutors.”); id. at 1570 (arguing that
“through charges and lobbying, prosecutors play a role in law making, enough to prompt Bill Stuntz to
describe prosecutors as ‘the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers’”).
10. Id. at 1564.
11. Pfaff’s claim is derived from surveys of state courts conducted by the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC) which, he argues, show that felony filings increased by about the same percentage
as prison admissions “between 1994 and 2008.” LOCKED IN, supra note 8, at 71-73. Pfaff argues, counter
to the weight of other scholarship, that nothing else changed over this period, revealing that “prosecutors
bringing more and more felony cases” was the “one thing” primarily responsible for Mass Incarceration.
Id. There are substantial flaws in Pfaff’s analysis as explained in my review, Reassessing Prosecutorial
Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835 (2018), and a subsequent review
by sociologist Katherine Beckett. See Mass Incarceration and Its Discontents, 47 CONTEMP. SOC. 11,
16 (2018) (“Pfaff’s analysis is undermined by methodological flaws, logical errors, and conceptual
limitations.”). Pfaff has only engaged with one aspect of these critiques, involving the late start date for
his range, 1994, well into the era of mass incarceration. And even on that point his response is
unconvincing. In his book and earlier scholarship, Pfaff wrote that he started with 1994 because the
NCSC “changed the way it gathered the data in 1994.” See LOCKED IN at 257 n.50 (“The NCSC gathered
data on felony filings before 1994, but it changed the way it gathered the data in 1994, making it hard to
compare across years.”); John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 Ga. St. U.
L. Rev. 1239, 1250 (2012) (“the NCSC revised how it gathered the data in 1994”). In my review, I
pointed out that the data-gathering change occurred in the middle of his date range (2003) not prior to it
(1994) – a correction Pfaff appears to accept. See John F. Pfaff, Prosecutors Matter: A Response to
Bellin’s Review of Locked In, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 165 (2018) (“Response”) (“Bellin points out,
correctly, that starting in 2003 the NCSC changed how it gathered its felony-filing data, leading to a
discrete jump in the number of felony filings.”); cf. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of
Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 741 (2018) (“In 2003, the NCSC made significant changes
to state reporting requirements.”). Pfaff, however, discounts the 2003 change because, he argues in his
Response, he did not rely on the NCSC’s published data but instead worked from an internal Excel
spreadsheet emailed to him by an NCSC analyst in which the data had been “retrofitt[ed]” “back to
1994.” Response at 166 (“the internal spreadsheet has the data corrected back to 1994”). It is good that
Pfaff tried to resolve the problems in the NCSC data, but it is beyond dispute that retrofitting across a
methodological change, particularly one involving the gathering of data, introduces additional
uncertainty. See Beckett, supra, at 19 & n.14 (quoting NCSC analyst explaining that the retrofitted data
Pfaff relied on suffers from “a data quality issue” whose “extent is unknown”); Shima Baradaran
Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors and Mass Incarceration, 94 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1123, 1142
& n. 99 (2021) (“historical comparisons before and after 2003 are discouraged due to methodology
changes by the NCSC”) (citing NCSC’s 2004 report); Stevenson & Mayson, supra, at 740-41
(“Currently, 2007 is as far back as the NCSC recommends going to evaluate time trends in criminal
caseloads.”). Indeed, Pfaff himself (using the wrong date) previously described comparisons across the
NCSC’s data-gathering change as “impossible.” Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth,
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certainly contribute to mass incarceration and the drug war, but there is little
evidence that they are leading the way.
As I explain in a new book, Mass Incarceration Nation: How the United
States Became Addicted to Prisons and Jails and How it Can Recover, the
unprecedented growth of imprisonment in this country arose through a consensus
of law enforcement actors pushing people down the “prison road”:
“If someone asks, why there are so many people in prison, one can point
to any of the actors involved: legislators, police, prosecutors, judges,
parole boards, and so on. After all, each actor could dramatically
decrease the number of folks in prison. But in a system with numerous
on- and off-ramps, it is misleading to highlight one ramp while ignoring
the others. Keeping people moving down the prison road requires the
cooperation of all the actors.”12
Beginning in the 1970s, the growing “tough on crime” consensus among
official actors generated two basic changes: a vertical increase in sentence
lengths and a horizontal expansion of the types of crimes that people were
incarcerated for. Capers’ target in this context, drug crimes, show up in both
places. And there is no aspect of American criminal law enforcement that
changed as dramatically over the past decades. In 1980, 6 percent of the State
prison population and 25 percent of the federal prison population was serving
time for a drug offense. By 2000, these numbers shot up to 20 percent (State)
and 57 percent (federal) respectively.13 Jail populations reflect the same trend,
with 9 percent of jail inmates incarcerated for drug offenses in the early 1980s,
increasing to over 20 percent in the 1990s and then plateauing. 14
Reversing the seismic shift in people incarcerated for drug offenses (and
more generally) requires an accurate assessment of its cause. Over the period,
politicians embraced a “War on Drugs.” To fight this war, legislators enacted
laws imposing harsh penalties for drug offenses and funded increasingly
aggressive enforcement. The number of sworn police officers (officers with
arrest authority) rose from 496,143 in 1986 to 765,246 by 2008. 15 These changes
had a dramatic effect. Annual drug arrests rose from 583,000 per year in 1980 to

supra, at 1250 (“the NCSC revised how it gathered the data in 1994 [sic], making it impossible to
compare data before and after 1994”).
12. Jeffrey Bellin, MASS INCARCERATION NATION: HOW THE UNITED STATES BECAME
ADDICTED TO PRISONS AND JAILS AND HOW IT CAN RECOVER (2023) [hereinafter MASS
INCARCERATION NATION].
13. Drug Policy Facts, Drugs and Prisons, Jails, Probation, and Parole, REAL REPORTING
FOUND., https://www.drugpolicyfacts.org/chapter/drug_prison# (sourced from the U.S. Justice
Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)).
14. Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,
2003, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 494 tbl.6.19 (2005), https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t619.pdf.
15. See Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 1992, BUREAU
JUST. STAT. 1, 3 tbl.2 (1993), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea92.pdf; Brian A. Reaves, Census
of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1, 2 tbls.1, 2 (2011),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/census-state-and-local-law-enforcement-agencies-2008.
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1.6 million per year in 2010.16 The magnitude of that change is startling. In the
space of a few decades, American police were making over a million more arrests
every year just for drug offenses. These arrests had numerous consequences,
leading most obviously to criminal prosecutions, but also to probation and parole
revocations – which have grown to about a third of prison admissions. 17
Of course, the drug war is more than just laws and arrests. It also includes
incarceration and that typically requires prosecutors and judges. Prosecutors
could have declined to prosecute all the new drug arrests pouring into their
offices, appellate judges could have rejected the overbearing tactics that typify
drug arrests, and trial judges could have resisted incarcerating folks for
victimless crimes. That didn’t happen. Steeped in the same rhetoric as legislators
and police, prosecutors and judges also embraced the War on Drugs.
Prosecutors uncritically processed the increase in drug cases authorized by
legislators and initiated by police, turning the explosion of arrests into an
explosion of convictions. Here is a graph from Mass Incarceration Nation that
illustrates the clear correlation between nationwide arrests (dotted line) and
convictions (solid line) for the most serious drug offense, distribution.
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Tougher prosecutors, tougher sentencing laws, and tougher judges also
meant longer sentences. Consistent with other studies, a study by the Pew
Research Center demonstrates that sentence lengths increased across the board
even as the number of convictions increased; specifically, drug “[o]ffenders
released in 2009 served [an average of] 2.2 years, up from 1.6 years in 1990.” 18

16. See
Arrest
Data
Analysis
Tool,
BUREAU
JUST.
STAT.,
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm.
17. See Reassessing Prosecutorial Power, supra note 7, at 844.
18. The PEW Center on the States, Time Served: The High Cost, Low Return of Longer Prison
Terms,
PEW
CHARITABLE
TR.
1,
3
(2012),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2012/06/06/time_served_report.pdf.
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The foregoing discussion reflects a theme that is fleshed out in detail in my
book. For drugs the picture is as clear as any, but a similar picture emerges in
every area of American criminal law that contributed to mass incarceration, from
weapons offenses to assaults to sex crimes. The historical record does not point
to a prosecution-led increase in enforcement. Instead, it shows all the criminal
justice actors moving together. Legislators enacted harsher laws (and funded
more aggressive enforcement), police made more arrests, prosecutors filed more
cases, and judges imposed longer sentences. And a fifth punitive mechanism was
also increasingly important: parole and probation officers sent more and more
people back to prison.
Prosecutors matter. But they are one piece of a large and complex puzzle.
And most importantly, prosecutors are primarily reactive, responding to the laws
enacted by legislators and the arrests made by police. Getting this diagnosis right
is critical to evaluating proposals like the one offered by Capers. Capers’
proposal makes perfect sense if prosecutors are truly the “one thing” responsible
for mass incarceration and the primary driver of drug enforcement. If, however,
politicians and police are also (or even primarily) pushing the “tough on crime”
agenda, jettisoning public prosecutors becomes a murky policy prescription and
may even prove counterproductive.
With respect to Capers’ primary example for reducing the footprint of the
criminal law (the drug war), legislators and police were not only forceful
proponents, but also major drivers of, aggressive drug enforcement. And since
they lay the foundation from which everything else follows, they (not
prosecutors) are the logical place to push for change. Of course, if those actors
resist, prosecutors offer another lever. But it is important to see that shrinking
American criminal law through reforms targeting prosecutors is an indirect and
generally second-best approach. If Capers succeeds in stripping public
prosecutors of the power to prosecute victimless crimes, politicians are unlikely
to throw in the towel. Legislators will seek alternative enforcement mechanisms
for the laws they enact. As I illustrate in my book, the key to understanding the
changes that brought us mass incarceration was that politicians were not content
with rhetorical “crime-fighting.” Republicans and Democrats united to transform
the system of the 1970s and abolish the “revolving door” of criminal justice.
They did this by pushing for greater enforcement and dramatically curtailing the
then-prevailing model of indeterminate sentencing and early parole release to
ensure that the severe determinate punishments they authorized would be
imposed.
The legislators who enacted and maintain the drug laws would have little
trouble turning Capers’ framework in their favor. Deprived of the services of
locally elected prosecutors, legislators could create more centralized
enforcement bureaucracies, staffed with attorneys who would be more, not less,
willing to implement legislative directives. Or they could authorize a broad
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swath of “victims” of drug crimes to pursue these cases, including police. Police
prosecutions are already a common phenomenon in some jurisdictions.19
All of which is to say, privatizing prosecution does not appear to be an
especially promising route to ending the drug war or mass incarceration. But that
does not mean I am not sympathetic. Capers article is characteristically smart
and provocative, forcing us to think deeply about the failings of a complex
system. Capers takes on reformers’ biggest challenge: how to reduce the
system’s swollen footprint without support from the legislators who most
directly shape that footprint, and the public, who elect those legislators. I think
the only lasting answer to this puzzle is to fight the hypothetical and reverse
widespread public (and legislative) perceptions that incarceration is a pragmatic
response to crime.20 Capers’ proposal, by connecting the public more closely to
individual prosecutions, could help to achieve that. As the public turns against
mass incarceration (and, more importantly, the micro mechanisms by which it
persists), direct reforms will become increasingly available. Reformers could
then reduce over-prosecution, particularly of victimless crimes, through the most
promising mechanism for lasting change: changing the law.
Reformers understandably target prosecutors when they are unable to
influence the true drivers of American criminal law: legislators and, ultimately,
the broader public. The weakness of prosecutor-focused policy reforms is that if
politicians oppose those reforms, the only solutions likely to last are those that
fly under the radar. Replacing public with private prosecution is not such a
change. By contrast, a reduction in charging by the public prosecutors we have,
such as that implemented across the country by locally elected (“progressive”)
prosecutors, can have a modest real-world impact.21 Rather than turn away from
public prosecutors, it may make more sense to support them, stressing the
importance of declinations and dismissals as a core function of the public
prosecutor’s role.22

19. Alexandra Natapoff, When the Police Become Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018).
20. MASS INCARCERATION NATION, supra note 12 (“The path back to the 1970s[-era
incarceration rates] depends on building a new consensus that incarceration is rarely (if ever) the
solution, especially to achieve policy goals, as opposed to justice.”).
21. See Angela J. Davis, The Perils of Private Prosecution, 13 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 7 (2022).
22. Cf. Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution: A Review of Charged by Emily
Bazelon, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 218, 245 (2020) (“When it comes to prosecutorial lenience, then,
more prosecutor power is better and (contrary to traditional academic voices) the best reform for that
power is no reform. Prosecutors can already offer leniency without check. This is the power reformminded prosecutors and their supporters can leverage unapologetically to temper the overly punitive
dynamics of American criminal justice.”).

